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Abstract 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to complement theoretical and qualitative literature with 
empirical evidence on the income-redistributive effect of mobile phone penetration in 52 
African countries. It deviates from mainstream country-specific and microeconomic survey-
based approaches in the literature and provides the first macroeconomic assessment of the 
‘mobile phone’-inequality nexus. The findings suggest that mobile penetration is pro-poor, as it 
has a positive income equality effect.  ‘Mobile phone’-oriented poverty reduction channels are 
discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Many lives have been transformed by the mobile revolution, which is providing not just 
communication but also basic financial access in the forms of phone-based money transfer and 
storage (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012). The significant growth 
and penetration rates of mobile telephony that are transforming cell phones into pocket-banks 
in Africa are also providing countries on the continent with increased affordable and cost-
effective means of bringing on board a large part of the population that hitherto has been 
excluded from formal financial services for decades. At the 2007 ‘Connect Africa’ summit, 
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Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda emphasized:  “in ten short years, what was once an object 
of luxury and privilege, the mobile phone has become a basic necessity in Africa” (Aker & 
Mbiti, 2010, 208). An article in The Economist (2008) earlier supported this claim: “a device 
that was a yuppie toy not so long ago has now become a potent for economic development in 
the world’s poorest countries”1. This paper seeks to assess how these sentiments and slogans 
are reflected in the incidence of ‘mobile phone penetration’ on income-redistribution in Africa. 
The assessment is of significant interest not only to banks and Micro Financial Institutions 
(MFIs) but also to governments, financial regulators as well as to development partners who 
are providing support to improve the livelihoods of Africans through poverty reduction and 
sustained economic growth.  
 Apart from the need to assess these sentiments, there is a growing body of work 
pointing to the imperative of more scholarly research on the phenomenon of mobile 
penetration
2
. To the best of our knowledge, one of the most exhaustive accounts in the ‘mobile 
penetration’ development literature concludes: “Existing empirical evidence on the effect of 
mobile phone coverage and services suggest that the mobile phone can potentially serve as a 
tool for economic development in Africa. But this evidence while certainly encouraging 
remains limited. First, while economic studies have focused on the effects of mobile phones for 
particular countries or markets, there is little evidence showing that this has translated into 
macroeconomic gains…” (Aker & Mbiti, 2010, 224). More so, as sustained by Maurer (2008) 
and confirmed in subsequent literature (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Thacker & Wright, 2012), 
scholarly research on the adoption and socioeconomic impacts of mobile-banking (payments) 
systems in the developing world is scarce. Most studies on mobile penetration have been 
                                                 
1
 Many studies have also assessed how tendencies of globalization have affected inequality and poverty (Ukpere & 
Slabbert, 2009; Shahbaz, 2010; O’Boyle & O’Boyle, 2012; Akerele et al., 2012).  
2
 “Relative to the spread of some other technologies that have been introduced in sub-Saharan Africa-improved 
seeds, solar cook stoves and agricultural technology-mobile phones adoption has occurred at a staggering rate on 
the continent. Yet few empirical economic studies have examined mobile phone adoption. This could be due to a 
variety of factors, including unreliable or nonexistent data on individual level adoption (leading to measurement 
error)…” Aker & Mbiti (2010, 225). 
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theoretical and qualitative in nature (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Merritt, 2010; 
Thacker & Wright, 2012). The few existing empirical works hinge on country-specific and 
micro-level data mostly collected from surveys (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012).  
 The aim of this paper is to complement theoretical literature with empirical evidence on 
the income-redistributive effect of mobile phone penetration. As far as we know, the 
macroeconomic pro-poor evidence of the mobile phenomenon is missing in the literature. This 
study covers 52 African countries and hence, provides a broad assessment of the incidence of 
mobile penetration on the poor in a continent most affected by stubbornly high poverty rates 
and growing income-inequality (Asongu, 2013a). The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
We briefly review existing literature in Section 2. Data and methodology are presented and 
outlined respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis is covered in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Mobile phone penetration, mobile banking and the poor  
 
2.1 Mobile phone penetration 
 
 Consistent with Asongu (2013b), we begin by presenting a clear picture of the depth of 
mobile phone penetration in Africa with some statistics. With respect to  Mbiti & Weil (2011), 
the story of the growth of mobile phones in Africa is one of a tectonic and unexpected change 
in communications technology. Accordingly, from virtually unconnected in the 1990s, over 
60% of Africa now has mobile phone coverage and there are now over ten times as many 
mobiles as landline phones in use (Aker & Mbiti, 2010).  Consistent with Aker & Mbiti, mobile 
phone coverage in Africa has progressed at jaw-breaking rates over the past decade. In 1999, 
only 11% of the African population had mobile phone coverage, primarily in Northern (Egypt, 
Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) and Sothern (Kenya and South Africa) Africa. As 
sustained by Asongu (2013b), by 2008, 60% of the population (477 million) could get a signal 
and an area of 11.2 million square kilometers had mobile phone coverage: equivalent to the 
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United Sates and Argentina combined.  According to Asongu, it was expected that by the end 
of 2012, most villages in Africa would have had coverage with only a handful of countries 
relatively unconnected. In line with Demombynes & Thegeya (2012), Kenya is the example of 
an African country that has undergone a remarkable information and communication 
technology (ICT) revolution.  Accordingly, towards to end of the 1990s, less than 3% of 
Kenyan households owned a telephone and less than 1 in 1000 Kenyan adults had mobile 
phone service. By the end of 2011 however, 93 percent of Kenyan households owned a mobile 
phone. This spectacular growth is largely credited to the M-PESA mobile-banking network 
(Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012, 23-25). 
 
2.2 Mobile banking and the poor  
The growth of mobile-banking (payments) systems has been particularly significant in 
the Philippines (where three million customers use systems offered by mobile operators Smart 
& Globe; Neville, 2006); Kenya (where nearly two million users registered with Safaricom M-
PESA  system within a year of its nationwide rollout, Vaughan, 2007; Ivatury & Mas, 2008) 
and South Africa where 450, 000 people use Wizzit (‘the bank in your pocket’; Ivatury & 
Pickens, 2006) or one of two other national systems (Porteous, 2007). Borrowing from Asongu 
(2013b), there are three main avenues along which the incidence of mobile phone penetration 
on mobile banking could be discussed.  While the first strand captures the usefulness of mobile 
transactions (store of value, conversion of cash and transfer of stored value), the second strand 
elucidates the concepts of savings (basic or partially integrated) in mobile banking. The last 
strand relates mobile banking to GSM
3
 phones.  
 The first strand that largely draws from Jonathan & Camilo (2008) stresses that most 
mobile transactions in developing countries enable users to do three main things: store value in 
an account, covert cash into and out of the bank account and transfer stored value between 
                                                 
3
 Global System of Mobile Communications.  
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accounts. (a) Store value (currency) in an account is accessible with the help of a handset. 
When the user already has a bank account, this is generally a matter of linking to a bank 
account. If the user does not possess an account, then the process opens one for him/her or 
creates a pseudo bank account, held by a third party or the user’s mobile operator. (b) 
Conversion of cash into and out of the store value account. In a situation where the account is 
linked to a bank account, then users can visit banks to cash-in and cash-out. In many scenarios, 
users can also visit the GSM providers’ retail stores. When most services are flexible, a user 
can visit a corner kiosk or grocery store (maybe the same one where he/she purchases airtime) 
and transact with an independent retailer working as an agent for the transaction system. (c) 
Transferring of stored value between accounts. Accordingly, users can generally transfer funds 
between accounts linked to two mobile phones by using a set of SMS messages (or menu 
commands) and PIN
4
 codes. Hence, the new services offer a way to move money from place to 
place and therefore present an alternative to the payments system offered by banks, pawn 
shops, remittance firms…etc. 
 The second strand elucidates the concept of savings. Demombynes & Thegeya (2012) 
have approached the mobile-finance nexus through this concept
5
. They have laid emphasis on 
two types of mobile savings. (a) Basic mobile savings; that is simply the usage of a standard 
mobile money system such as M-PESA to store funds. These basic mobile savings do not 
generate interest. The strand on bank-integrated mobile savings has received a great deal of 
attention as a way of providing banking services to the poor. They particularly have the 
                                                 
4
 Personal Identification Number.  
5
 Accordingly, in order to have a mobile money account and make a deposit, a customer must own a cell phone 
SIM card with the mobile operator and register for a mobile money account. The customer can then make cash 
deposits (savings) at the physical offices of one of the operator’s mobile money agents. Hence, these cash deposits 
create electronic money credit in the account. The customer can make person-to-person transfers of mobile money 
credit to the accounts of other mobile money users in the same network. (S)he can also use their mobile money 
credit to pay bills and to buy phone airtime. Cash withdrawals could be made at the offices of the network’s 
mobile money agents. There is also an option for a mobile money customer to make a transfer to someone who is 
not registered with the same network. In this option, when notice of the transfer is received through an SMS text 
message, the recipient can receive the cash at a mobile money agent (Demombynes, & Thegeya, 2012; Asongu, 
2013b). 
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advantage of offering access to basic banking services without requiring proximity to a 
physical bank branch. Therefore, with a bank-integrated mobile savings account, basic banking 
services can be accessed with the help of a network of mobile phone agents, which in Kenya 
outnumber the weight of bank branches significantly (Mas & Radcliffe, 2011). (b) The term 
‘partially integrated’ mobile savings system is also used to describe circumstances in which the 
access to bank account through mobile phones is contingent on the establishment of a 
traditional account at a physical bank. Accordingly, banks are beginning to build their own 
agent networks as means of assuming a more competitive bargaining position in accessing 
mobile service platforms. Fully and partially integrated savings present distinct types of 
contracts among partnering banks and mobile service providers. On the one hand, a partially 
integrated product clearly delineates the role of the bank (which provides and owns banking 
services) from that of the mobile service provider which provides mobile telephony 
infrastructure and controls the agent network (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012). Hence, the 
bank compensates the mobile service provider for access to the network and reaps the 
remaining profits. This type of contract more closely resembles a debt contract among the 
parties. On the other hand, a fully integrated solution may not lay emphasis on the same 
distinction between bank and mobile service providers. In this scenario, the distribution of 
surplus depends on the relative bargaining power of the bank and mobile service provider. This 
type of contract more closely looks like an equity contract between two parties. Equity-oriented 
contracts are more likely to be complex and hence more difficult to negotiate than debt-like 
contracts, there-by presenting a potential draw-back in the goal of facilitating access.  
 In the last strand, mobile banking is linked to GSM phones.  To the best of our 
knowledge, Ondiege (2010) Chief Economist at the African Development Bank provides one 
of the most exhaustive accounts on the nexuses between mobile banking and GSM phones. 
According to him, there are four main linkages. Firstly, the mobile phone can serve as a virtual 
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bank card where information on the customer and institution is securely stored, thereby 
avoiding the cost of distributing cards to customers. He lays emphasis on the fact that, the 
subscriber identity module (SIM) card inside most GSM phones is in itself a smartcard that is 
similar to the virtual bank card. Hence, the banks customer’s PIN and account number can be 
saved on this SIM card to perform the same functions as the bank virtual card. Secondly, the 
mobile phone could play the role of a point of sale (POS) terminal. Thus, a mobile phone could 
be used to transact and communicate with the appropriate financial institution to solicit 
transaction authorization. These are similar functions of a POS terminal at mails, retail or other 
stores. A mobile phone can therefore duplicate these functionalities with ease. Thirdly, the 
mobile phone can also be used as an automatic teller machine (ATM). A POS is therefore used 
to pay for commodities at the store. If cash and access to savings were to be considered as 
commodities that customers buy and store, then the POS will also serve as a cash collection and 
distribution point which basically is the function of an ATM. Lastly, the mobile phone may be 
used as an internet banking terminal. This implies, it offers two fundamental customer services: 
a) ability to make payments and transfers remotely and; b) instant access to any account. 
Ultimately, the mobile phone device and wireless connectivity bring the internet terminal into 
the hands of otherwise unbanked customers.  
 In light of the above interesting literature, as far as we have reviewed there is currently 
no study that has assessed the effects of mobile phone penetration on poverty. As highlighted in 
the introduction, most studies on mobile penetration have been theoretical and qualitative in 
nature (Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Merritt, 2010; Thacker & Wright, 2012). The 
few existing empirical works hinge on country-specific and micro-level data mostly collected 
from surveys (Demombynes & Thegeya, 2012). Hence, this missing gap in the literature 
provides a unique opportunity to complement existing literature with a macroeconomic 
assessment of the mobile-inequality nexus.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data  
 
We examine a sample of 52 African countries with data from World Development 
Indicators (WDI) and the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) of the World 
Bank (WB). The mobile penetration rate is obtained from the African Development Bank 
(AfDB). This rate could also proxy for mobile banking/activities (Ondiege, 2010; Aker & 
Mbiti, 2010). Due to constraints in the time series properties of the mobile penetration 
measurement, the data structure is cross-sectional and consists of 2003-2009 average growth 
rates. The indicator for inequality is the GINI coefficient which measures income disparity 
among values of the frequency distribution. A value of zero denotes equality while a coefficient 
of one expresses maximal inequality. The GINI index has been used in recent Africa inequality 
literature (Batuo et al., 2010), as well as in many disciplines studying inequality (sociology, 
economics, health science, agriculture…etc).  
In the regressions, we shall control for the macroeconomic environment (inflation, GDP 
growth, financial depth), globalization (trade), foreign-aid and quality of institutions (rule of 
law). The following discussion is relevant to their expected signs in relation to inequality. We 
expect: high inflation to fuel inequality (Albanesi, 2007) while, low inflation should reduce it 
(Bulir, 1998; Lopez, 2004);  GDP growth to reduce inequality conditional on even-distribution 
of the fruits of economic prosperity; financial depth decreases uneven income distribution (Kai 
& Hamori, 2009); the impact of foreign-aid depends on the quality of institutions and nature of 
development assistance
6
; consistent with recent African inequality literature (Kai & Hamori, 
2009, p. 15), trade openness should have a negative income-redistributive effect
7
 and; the rule 
of law is expected to have an equalizing income-effect.  
                                                 
6
 For instance, but for a few exceptions, military targeted aid should not be expected to reduce inequality.  
7
 However from intuition, trade can either increase or decrease inequality depending on the proportion of the poor 
relying on agricultural exports. On the other hand, cheap imports could increase savings and thus, indirectly 
improve the income-distribution of the population in lower-income brackets. In the same vein, a significant import 
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Details about the variables’ definitions and sources of data, descriptive statistics with 
presentation of countries and correlation analysis (showing the basic correlations between key 
variables employed in this paper) are presented in the appendices.  The summary statistics 
(Appendix 1) of the variables used in the cross-sectional regressions show that, there is quite a 
degree of variation in the data utilized so that one should be reasonably confident that estimated 
relationships should emerge. The object of the correlation matrix (Appendix 2) is to manage 
issues resulting from overparametization and multicolinearity.  Based on the correlation 
coefficients, there do not seem to be any serious concerns in terms of the relationships to be 
modeled. Definition and corresponding sources of the variables are reported in Appendix 3.  
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
Due to the cross-sectional structure of our data, we follow an empirical specification 
employed in the inequality literature for this type of data structure (Andrés, 2006)
8
. This 
empirical strategy has also been employed in recent African mobile phone literature (Asongu, 
2013b). The model to be estimated is as follows: 
 
  GDPgRLNODAMInflationTradeMobileInequality 76543210 2
 (1) 
 
where, Inequality denotes the GINI coefficient,  Mobile is the mobile phone penetration rate, 
Trade refers to trade openness, Inflation is  the inflation rate, M2 stands for financial depth, 
NODA represents foreign-aid, RL is the rule of law, GDPg stands for economic prosperity and, 
  is the error term. Robustness of the analysis will be ensured by: (1) use of alternative 
specifications; (2) modeling with Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) 
standard errors; (3) RAMSEY’s Regression Equation Specification Error Test (RESET) for 
validity of model specification and; (4) modeling with Two-Stage Least Squares to control for 
                                                                                                                                                           
of ‘substitution goods’ produced by domestic industries could fuel income-inequality if majority of the poor 
depend substantially on the affected industries for subsistence income. 
8
 An OLS approach with a lot of controls for the omitted variable bias problems is convenient because of lack of  
good instruments at a macro level necessary for an Instrumental Variable  empirical strategy.  
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endogeneity. Since the baseline modeling is with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the four basic 
concerns of this approach are addressed. While, autocorrelation in residuals and 
heteroscedasticity are tackled with HAC standard errors, the assumption of linearity is verified 
with the RESET. As we have already highlighted above, the correlation analysis in Appendix 2 
has guided us to avoid issues of multicolinearity and overparametization.  
 
4. Empirical results  
 
This empirical section addresses two main issues: (1) the ability of ‘mobile phone 
penetration’ to explain income-inequality conditional on other covariates (control variables) 
and; (2) the possibility of non-linear combinations of the fitted values explaining the response 
variable. While, the first issue is addressed by the significance and signs of estimated 
coefficients, the second depends on the result of RAMSEY’s RESET. The intuition behind the 
RESET is that, if non-linear combinations of the explanatory variables have any power in 
explaining the response variable, then the model is misspecified. Hence, the RESET is a 
general specification test for the linear regression model. The null hypothesis of this test is the 
position that, non-linear combinations of the fitted values have no explanatory power on 
income-inequality. Thus, failure to reject the null hypothesis lends credit to the linear model 
specification.  
Table 1 reports regressions of inequality on the mobile phone penetration (mobile) 
channel. At first glance, from a general standpoint, it could be noticed that the linearity 
assumption in our model specification is valid since all the null hypotheses of the RESET are 
not overwhelmingly rejected. The White tests for heteroscedasticity also fail to reject the null 
hypotheses of no heteroscedasticity. From specific outcomes, it could be established that, 
‘mobile penetration’ has an equalizing income effect. Most of the control variables are 
significant with the right signs. Financial depth has a positive income-redistributive effect in 
Africa: consistent with Kai & Hamori (2009). High inflation (above 117% in the mean from 
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Appendix 1) fuels inequality, in line with Albanesi (2007). Trade openness has a negative 
income-redistributive effect for a significant part of the African continent (Kai & Hamori, 
2009).  
Table 1: Effect of mobile penetration on inequality (HAC standard errors consistent) 
 Dependent Variable: GINI Index 
 Regressions without  HAC standard errors Regressions with HAC standard errors 
 Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  1* Model  2* Model  3* 
Constant  65.605*** 67.834*** 74.214*** 65.605*** 67.834*** 74.214*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile penetration  -17.844** -18.509** -21.837** -17.844*** -18.509*** -21.837** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.003) (0.005) (0.014) 
Trade 0.084*** 0.078** 0.077** 0.084*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 
 (0.009) (0.023) (0.029) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) 
Inflation  0.444** 0.508** 0.471* 0.444** 0.508** 0.471** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.074) (0.014) (0.013) (0.024) 
Financial depth  -8.672* -9.584* -12.392** -8.672* -9.584* -12.392* 
 (0.077) (0.068) (0.047) (0.073) (0.081) (0.071) 
NODA --- -0.068 -0.057 --- -0.068 -0.057 
  (0.560) (0.633)  (0.565) (0.588) 
Rule of Law --- --- 1.825 --- --- 1.825 
   (0.437)   (0.283) 
GDP growth  --- --- 0.321 --- --- 0.321 
   (0.614)   (0.530) 
       
RAMSEY RESET 1.505 1.536 1.745 1.505 1.536 1.7455 
 (0.242) (0.237) (0.200) (0.243) (0.237) (0.200) 
White’s test  15.322 21.421 7.272 15.322 21.421 7.272 
 (0.356) (0.372) (0.923) (0.356) (0.372) (0.923) 
Adjusted R² 0.492 0.478 0.456 0.492 0.478 0.456 
Fisher  8.023*** 6.321*** 4.480*** 12.153*** 9.004*** 6.106*** 
Observations  52 52 52 52 52 52 
       
  *;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent.  NODA:  
Net Official Development Assistance. P-values in brackets.  
 
 Table 2 below reports results of an Instrumental Variable (IV) Two Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) approach. Since, “mobile phone penetration” can be assimilated to “mobile banking” 
(Ondiege, 2010; Aker & Mbiti, 2010), we employ instrumental variables documented in the 
finance-growth literature.  We are limited to only two control variables because of constraints 
in degrees of freedom necessary for the Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR) test of 
instrument validity
9
. From the results: (1) endogeneity does not appear to be an issue in the data 
set (see Hausman test); (2) the instruments  are valid (see Sargan test) and; (3) but for a slight 
                                                 
9
 An OIR test is only employable in the presence of over-identification. That is, the instruments must be higher 
than the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In the cases of exact-identification 
(instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-identifications (instruments less than 
endogenous explaining variables) an OIR test is by definition not possible. 
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change in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, the signs and significance of the 
independent variables are the same as in Table 1.  
 The results are broadly consistent with recent African literature (Asongu, 2013c,d; 
Asongu, 2012a,b).  Accordingly, the growth of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) has been documented to have a positive income-redistributive effect through software 
piracy (Asongu, 2013c). Generally, the ICTs sector has positively affected the informal 
financial sector (Asongu, 2012a) which in tend has had an inequality mitigating effect (Asongu, 
2013d) or a general improvement of African paths towards knowledge-based economies 
(Asongu, 2012b).  
 
Table 2: Robustness checks with a Two-Stage Least Squares approach 
 Dependent Variable: GINI Index 
 Regressions without  HAC standard errors Regressions with HAC standard errors 
 Model  1 Model  2 Model  3 Model  1* Model  2* Model  3* 
Constant  72.232*** 75.707*** 77.887** 72.232*** 75.707*** 77.887*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Mobile penetration  -17.099* -23.607*** -24.819 -17.099 -23.607*** -24.819** 
 (0.073) (0.003) ( 0.104) (0.153) (0.000) (0.039) 
Inflation  --- 0.852** 0.846* --- 0.852** 0.846** 
  (0.038) (0.056)  (0.021) (0.021) 
Financial depth  --- --- -0.508 --- --- -0.508 
   (0.974)   (0.975) 
       
Hausman test 0.330 2.340 1.676 0.330 2.340 1.676 
 (0.565) (0.310) (0.642) (0.565) (0.310) (0.642) 
Sargan OIR   3.022 0.721 0.597 3.022 0.721 0.597 
 (0.388) (0.697) (0.439) (0.388) (0.697) (0.439) 
Adjusted R² 0.083 0.289 0.273 0.083 0.289 0.273 
Chi-Square  3.200* --- --- 2.038 --- --- 
Fisher  --- 6.294*** 4.057** --- 9.266*** 6.205*** 
Observations  52 52 52 52 52 52 
       
Instruments  Lower Middle Income, Middle Income, English Legal origin, Christian domination 
       
  *;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
. P-values in brackets. OIR: Overidentifying restrictions test.  
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The aim of this paper has been to complement theoretical literature with empirical 
evidence on the income-redistributive effect of mobile phone penetration. The findings suggest 
that mobile penetration is good for the poor, as it has a positive income-redistributive effect. 
This equalizing incidence could be explained from several angles. Firstly, many lives have 
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been transformed by the mobile revolution thanks to basic financial access in the form of 
phone-based money transfer and storage (Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Demombynes & Thegeya, 
2012). Hence, the significant growth and penetration rates of mobile telephony that is 
transforming cell phones into pocket-banks in Africa is providing countries in the continent 
with increase affordable and cost-effective means of bringing on board a large part of the 
population that have until now been excluded from formal financial services for decades.  
Secondly, mobile phones can assist households’ budget when faced with unpredictable 
shocks which drive poverty. The probability of a poor family incurring drastic loss due to an 
unpredictable shock is certainly mitigated and lowered when families are able to respond to the 
shock in a more timely fashion. Hence, the mobile phone could have the greatest effects on 
poverty reduction during vulnerable shock experiences through driving down costs associated 
to the shock. Better financial management and coping with shock include: incurring lower 
travel costs, more efficient action, less trauma and improved access to information. Immediate 
positive feedbacks of income saving and cost mitigation are found particularly during 
vulnerable situations like death or illness in the family. It is also interesting to cite security 
increases for poor families through reduced loss of poverty. For instance, a family’s ability to 
scale-down the number of overnight hospital days or capacity to avoid transport cost during 
desperate situations are some major cost saving strategies implemented with the quick dial of 
the mobile phone. In a nutshell, the communication device provides a means of timely 
response, reduced surprises, multi-task and plans during shocks, as well as less time to 
physically search individuals during difficult ordeals.  
Thirdly, mobile phones could empower women to engage in small businesses (and/or 
run existing businesses more efficiently), hence enabling them to bridge the gap between 
gender income inequality.  
14 
 
It is also interesting to point-out that, mobile phones represent long-term economic 
growth investments for the disadvantaged in income-distribution. Hence, many households 
maybe willing to cope with unpleasant sacrifices (such as reduction in food consumption or 
sanitation in the perceived short-term) in the hope that, the mobile phone would improve their 
opportunities with income and jobs in the long-term.  
 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics  
  Mean S.D Min Max Observations 
GINI Coefficient 43.100 7.702 29.760 65.770 52 
Mobile Penetration 1.674 0.217 1.043 2.242 52 
 
 
Control 
Variables 
Trade 82.221 37.303 34.609 211.28 52 
Inflation 117.95 764.60 1.953 5304.8 52 
Financial Depth 0.339 0.242 0.079 1.022 52 
NODA 11.015 12.229 0.0549 65.461 52 
Rule of Law -0.703 0.667 -2.419 0.950 52 
GDP growth 4.760 3.087 -6.959 12.894 52 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum.  Max: Maximum.   
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Correlation matrix  
Mobile  Trade Inflation Fin. depth NODA R. of Law GDPg GINI  
1.000 -0.444 -0.031 -0.496 0.268 -0.367 0.255 -0.3355 Mobile 
 1.000 0.026 0.268 -0.160 0.147 -0.107 0.451 Trade 
  1.000 -0.092 -0.024 -0.258 -0.569 0.161 Inflation 
   1.000 -0.259 0.665 -0.234 0.170 Fin. depth 
    1.000 -0.262 -0.083 -0.198 NODA 
     1.000 0.075 0.115 R. of Law 
      1.000 -0.272 GDPg 
       1.000 GINI  
         
Fin: Financial. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. R. of Law: Rule of Law.  
 
 
 
 
  Appendix 3: Variable definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable definitions Sources 
Inequality  GINI GINI Inequality Index  WDI 
Mobile Phone Penetration  Mobile  Seven year average growth rate (% of population) AfDB 
Trade  Openness  Trade  Export plus Imports of commodities (% of GDP) WDI 
Inflation  Inflation Consumer Price Index (Annual %) WDI 
Financial Depth  M2 Money supply (% of GDP) FDSD 
Rule of Law  RL Rule of Law (Estimate)  WDI 
Economic Prosperity  GDPg  Gross Domestic Product (Annual %)  WDI 
WDI: World Development Indicators. AfDB: African Development Bank. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database.  
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